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Abstract 
The rent-to-own (RTO) industry, by offering immediate access to household goods for a small periodic fee 
with no credit check or down payment, has strong appeal to low income and ﬁnancially distressed consumers. 
An important policy question is whether an RTO agreement is used as a rental/lease with build-in purchase 
option or as something more akin to an installment loan. Given the embedded options to return the item or to 
purchase it early, the actual rent paid by RTO customers is substantially lower than the oft-reported total rent 
which assumes that agreements go to term. We employ a log-normal censored regression model to analyze 
the inﬂuence of customer demographics as well as the transactional details of the contract on the rent paid by 
consumers using rent-to-own. Our main conclusions are (1) it is the “working poor” that are likely to pay more 
rent, (2) there appears to be a clientele effect with customers paying more rent under bi-weekly and monthly, 
as opposed to weekly, payment schedules, and (3) customers who exhibit delinquency in making contractual 
payments generally end up paying more rent. Further, our data allows some observations on annual percentage 
rates by illustrating the business risk present for RTO stores as well as the cross-subsidization of consumers. 
 
JEL classiﬁcation: C24; D14; G29 
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1. Introduction 
This paper represents a comprehensive study of the nature of rent-to-own (RTO) contracts. We 
provide new insights into the nature of this ﬁnancial contract by applying careful econometric 
analysis to actual detailed transactional data drawn from stores in the industry. While the extant 
literature has relied on relatively small scale customer interviews or surveys,1 the richness of our 
data allows quantiﬁcation of variables otherwise unavailable. Two general themes emerge from 
our analysis with parametric models for censored data. The ﬁrst is a demographic picture of RTO 
customers. As one might expect, the typical RTO customer can be described as a member of the 
“working poor,” and we show how variations in demographic characteristics impact the amount 
of rent that a customer pays. These results are consistent with and complementary to the existing 
literature. The second, and more interesting, theme of our analysis relates to actual transactional 
details of the contracts. For instance, we are able to examine the impact of payment frequency 
and late payment history. We ﬁnd that more rent is paid by customers who use bi-weekly and 
monthly, rather than weekly, payment schedules as well as, surprisingly, those who are delinquent 
in making payments. In addition to the various implications that emerge from the formal model, 
useful descriptive statistics are also provided which, interesting in and of themselves, contribute 
to our understanding of the nature of rent-to-own. 
The rent-to-own industry from its beginnings in the 1960s has grown into an important sector of 
the retailing industry. Currently, there are over 8000 RTO stores in the United States with revenues 
of over US$ 5.3 billion (APRO, 2001). The heart of the RTO arrangement is that consumers 
gain immediate access to new or used merchandise – most commonly appliances, electronics or 
furniture – with neither a credit check nor down payment in exchange for a rental payment due 
either weekly, bi-weekly or monthly. The agreement has a ﬁxed time period, usually from 12 
to 24 months; however, the consumer may terminate the contract at any point by returning the 
merchandise or by using a lump sum payment option. Should all payments be made, or the early 
purchase option used, the customer takes ownership of the merchandise. However, no adverse 
credit action occurs if the consumer decides to terminate after only one payment or after just a few. 
The industry serves to a large extent lower income consumers. As such, RTO transactions 
are often grouped with other alternative ﬁnancial services such as check-cashing stores, payday 
lenders and pawn shops (for an overview see Swagler, Burton, & Lewis, 1995). These transactions 
have produced much interest among consumer advocates who argue that they may take advantage 
of low income consumers who can least afford to pay high prices.2 The extreme form of this 
argument is that RTO agreements are really disguised installment agreements at usurious interest 
rates aimed to exploit unsophisticated consumers with few alternatives.3 In contrast, Anderson 
and Jackson (2001) argue that the contract contains many option-like features which are valuable 
for such consumers. A key element in this debate is the amount of rent a consumer actually pays 
and it is this open empirical question that our paper seeks to address. 
The issue is an important public policy question, and one which has generated a fair amount 
of attention from government. At the state level, 47 states have passed laws regulating RTO 
transactions and federal legislation has been proposed.4 Further, the Federal Trade Commission 
has produced a major report on the industry (FTC, 2000). 
1 FTC (2000) is an exception as it surveys 524 customers identiﬁed from a sample of 12,000 consumers. 
2 See Andreasen (1993) for an introduction to the issues of consumer advocacy for the disadvantaged. 
3 Freedman (1993) notes the high annual percentage interest rates and Walden (1990) argues that RTO prices substantially 
exceed dealer cost while Hill, Ramp, and Silver (1998) argue that prices cannot be justiﬁed by the return option or other 
services offered. McKernan, Lacko, and Hastak (2003), Swagler and Wheeler (1989), and Zikmund-Fisher and Parker 
(1999) examine consumer experience and motivation for entering into a RTO agreement. 
4 North Carolina, New Jersey and Wisconsin are the three exceptions. Lacko, McKernan, and Hastak (2002) and their 
citations provide a very good regulatory overview. 
This study examines the rent to own arrangement using a unique data set of transactional 
information drawn from four RTO stores in the Southeast. We take as the dependent variable the 
proportion of rent paid relative to the amount due if the contract went full term. This variable is 
important for two reasons. First, as a measure of ﬁnancial obligation, it contributes insight into 
customer usage. Second, for purchases, it speaks to the actual cost of this ﬁnancing arrangement. 
It also enables the development of novel stylized facts contributing to our understanding of 
these consumers and to the associated policy debate. We have information on personal charac­
teristics of customers (e.g., gender, age and income level). Also, we have transaction-speciﬁc 
information—divided into contract structure (e.g., required payment frequency and total amount 
due), contract usage (e.g., if it is a repeat customer and, if so, the number of prior transactions), 
and contract payment history (e.g., proportion and variability of late payments). We assess the 
inﬂuence of such determinants on the proportion of rent paid. As the data represent a complete 
transaction history up to the data acquisition date, a signiﬁcant percent of the observations are 
censored, i.e., active contracts with customers continuing to make payments. In order to deal 
appropriately with such censoring, we estimate a standard Tobit-type normal model as well as a 
more appropriate lognormal model. 
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section describes the data set and the 
variables used in the model. Section 3 contains the methodology and the speciﬁcation issues. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results, identifying several empirical regularities. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Data and variables 
The data set was drawn from proprietary information from four stores of a small rent-to-own 
(RTO) chain in the Southeast. The stores were located in three states: Alabama, Louisiana and 
two in Mississippi. It represents all available transactional records as of the date gathered and 
was ﬁltered only to remove personal information to ensure consumer conﬁdentiality. The infor­
mation was gathered with the cooperation of the Association of Progressive Rental Organizations 
(APRO), the industry trade group; High Touch, Inc., the primary supplier of RTO store man­
agement software; and the anonymous chain owner. At the store level, the detailed history of an 
individual transaction – from which we draw our data – is automatically purged 14 months after 
concluding (transactions involving stolen merchandise are kept longer). To avoid a truncation 
issue, we restricted attention to records originating within this 14-month period, thereby ensur­
ing that no transaction contemporaneous to one in the data set could be omitted. To extend the 
available data window, the data were regathered at a later period and the two gatherings merged. 
Further ﬁltering of spoiled records voided at origination but retained for auditing purposes as well 
as transactions with missing information resulted in 7517 observations which originated over a 
two year period from June 1, 2000, through May 31, 2002. 
Table 1 disaggregates the resulting data by outcome and by item under agreement. The data are 
classiﬁed into four merchandise categories: appliances, electronics, furniture and other.5 Note that 
the ﬁrst three categories are roughly equally represented with furniture the largest and appliances 
the smallest and, collectively, make up over 90% of items under agreement. Further, the data are 
classiﬁed by ultimate outcome into active, returned or charged off, i.e., still ongoing as of the data 
5 Appliances include, e.g., washers and dryers, refrigerators, and air conditioners. Electronics includes televisions and 
stereos. Furniture includes items for the living room and bedroom. Other includes jewelry and services such as a pager or 
cell phone access. 
Table 1 
Data set disaggregated by agreement outcome and by items under agreement 
Category All Appliances Electronics Furniture Other 
All 
Active 
7,517 (100%) 
1,105 (14.70%) 
2,057 (27.37%) 
342 
2,238 (29.77%) 
271 
2,667 (35.48%) 
407 
555 (7.38%) 
85 
Returned 
Voluntary 
Involuntary 
4,673 (62.17%) 
3,952 (84.6%) 
721 (15.4%) 
1,225 
1,011 
214 
1,528 
1,304 
224 
1,604 
1,357 
247 
316 
280 
36 
Charged off 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
1,739 (23.13%) 
1,513 (87.00%) 
226 (13.00%) 
490 
463 
27 
439 
348 
91 
656 
595 
61 
154 
107 
47 
The table disaggregates the data by number of observations; relative percentages are given in parentheses. Italized entries 
represent subtotals in the returned and charged off categories, respectively. 
collection date; terminated with the return of the merchandise to the store; or, terminated without 
merchandise return, respectively.6 Inspection of this categorization reveals a customer base which 
has substantial issues making their required payments. Over 15% of returns are involuntary, i.e., 
occur following some type of collection problem and so more accurately may be denoted as 
“recovered.” Additionally, 13% of charge offs are unfavorable, i.e., represent merchandise neither 
recovered nor fully paid for—in our sample this is 226 transactions or 3.5% of the 6412 completed. 
Taken together, almost 15% of completed agreements terminate following some type of payment 
issue and, in nearly a quarter of these cases, the merchandise is written off as unrecoverable. 
2.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in this study is the proportion of rent paid. That is, actual rent 
paid relative to total rent where total rent implicitly assumes agreements go to term, i.e., total 
rent is rent per month times the maximum possible number of months. Percentage rent paid 
as the primary variable of analysis is attractive for several reasons. For instance, one common 
concern of consumer groups is the very high cost of RTO as an acquisition mechanism. In the 
extant literature, such cost calculations have been made assuming payment to term. If, in con­
trast to this, the average “purchaser” acquires the merchandise relatively early in the contract 
paying only a fraction of the total then the effective interest rate would be much less. Fur­
ther, a complaint lodged against RTO is that they let the customer get close to ownership and 
then somehow manipulate the contract so that the item gets returned. These are both concerns 
that need to be addressed to make informed public policy. At the same time, they are empiri­
cal questions addressed by our dependent variable. We further believe this dependent variable 
contributes to our understanding of consumer behavior by allowing us to observe the impact 
of, e.g., payment structure, dollar size and chronologic contract length on proportionate rent 
paid which, in turn, offers evidence of the impact that the structure of the deal has on the 
outcome. 
6 A favorable charge off occurs when a customer acquires merchandise after making all scheduled payments or by 
exercising the early purchase option. Unfavorable is when the store gets neither all rent due nor the merchandise back 
writing the loss off to bad debt, damaged, skip, stolen or other. Likewise, an involuntary return is when the store recovers 
the merchandise after experiencing collection problems; voluntary is the item returned citing a short term need, cannot 
afford, exchange, service or other. 
Table 2 
Sample median and mean of percentage rent paid 
Category All Appliances Electronics Furniture Other 
Overall 14.70 (28.91) 17.30 (31.02) 9.90 (24.51) 16.40 (30.01) 21.20 (33.51) 
Contract outcome 
Return 
Favorable charge off 
Unfavorable charge off 
6.90 (13.05) 
80.20 (66.06) 
20.10 (26.55) 
7.70 (13.40) 
81.10 (67.62) 
19.00 (27.48) 
5.10 (11.26) 
85.05 (68.91) 
14.40 (24.46) 
7.80 (13.55) 
74.40 (63.21) 
26.40 (29.33) 
9.00 (17.86) 
82.40 (65.91) 
20.90 (26.44) 
Payment type 
Weekly contracts 
Bi-weekly contracts 
Monthly contracts 
6.00 (19.77) 
30.80 (41.16) 
31.10 (39.30) 
6.40 (20.84) 
32.50 (41.69) 
34.50 (42.12) 
4.60 (16.22) 
27.00 (37.17) 
30.80 (38.09) 
6.80 (20.57) 
31.10 (42.54) 
32.90 (39.68) 
11.70 (28.30) 
44.25 (47.33) 
23.10 (30.80) 
Payment history 
On-time payer 
Late payer 
2.40 (8.09) 
33.30 (42.45) 
2.60 (8.99) 
35.10 (43.94) 
1.80 (6.05) 
30.15 (40.67) 
2.60 (9.04) 
31.70 (41.62) 
3.30 (10.82) 
41.10 (47.57) 
For each category the median appears ﬁrst with the mean next in parentheses. The calculations ignore censoring and 
therefore are biased downwards (see footnote 8). Statistics are provided for the proportion of rent paid both overall and 
disaggregated by contract outcome, payment schedule (frequency), and contract payment history; where on-time (late) is 
deﬁned as none (at least half) of the payments made late. 
Table 2 gives the median and mean values of this variable.7 Overall, the median (mean) rent 
paid is 14.7% (28.9%) of the amount due under the RTO agreement reﬂecting, in part, many 
customers who either return or purchase early. This number clearly suggests that the contract is not 
functionally equivalent to installment credit for the average consumer. At the same time however, 
clearly some consumers are acquiring merchandise via RTO and so the previous fact alone does 
not settle the public policy question of whether there is a need to protect such “purchasers.” Also 
of interest is the variation across the item subsets, with electronics having the smallest amount of 
rent paid and appliances the most. 
The averages for the proportion of rent paid disaggregated by contract outcome, payment type, 
and payment history are also presented. With regard to contract outcome, we ﬁnd that the overall 
median (mean) for favorable charge offs, i.e., purchases, is 80% (66%) – the average purchaser 
paying less than 100% reﬂects the exercise of the early purchase option – and for returns it is only 
7% (13%). Note also that the median (mean) rent paid for unfavorable charge offs is just about 20% 
(27%), further dramatizing the credit risk issue even ignoring the costs in time and effort of attempt­
ing collection. Even if due to their mark-up the store’s loss from such behavior is relatively small, 
clearly such action is being subsidized by those customers using RTO to purchase merchandise. 
Interestingly, the result that the mean rent paid is only 29% of total rent, with about 23.6% of 
the items actually purchased, is a complete reversal of the common perception that 60–70% of the 
goods are acquired under RTO contracts.8 There are a number of issues which partly reconcile 
7 The summary statistics are simple averages of the data set—including the active contracts which use the percent rent 
paid as of the observation date. This induces a downward bias in the table due to the limited observation period. That is, 
transactions that are very short are more likely to have had time to conclude while transactions running a relatively long 
period are more likely to be censored (still be active) and so the average will be too small. However, simply dropping the 
active contracts would exacerbate this bias. We note that the regression results are free of this bias as the methodology 
employed corrects for this in the estimated likelihood function. 
8 For example, FTC (2000) reports that 66.8% of customers intended to purchase the item being rented (their Table 5.1) 
and that, of the transactions completed at the time of survey, 64.3% resulted in acquisition (their Table 5.2 shows, of the 
this difference but do not eliminate it. First, it should be noted that the sample mean is biased 
downward due to the 15% of observations that are active (censored) with customers continuing to 
make payments. Second, our data set is based on transactions while the extant literature focuses 
on customer surveys. Survey data suffers from misreporting, either simple memory errors or 
something more.9 Further, survey data may pick up customer intent which, of course, can diverge 
from the actual outcome. One can also argue there is a bias toward over-reporting purchases if 
that is perceived as a positive outcome while returns, particularly if involuntary, may be perceived 
negatively and under-reported. A related issue is consumer fraud; our sample shows a signiﬁcant 
amount of items being charged off by stores as unrecoverable (stolen or damaged) and it is 
unlikely that such behavior would be reported in a telephone interview. Finally, there is the issue 
of merchandise exchanges. Another empirical regularity of our data set is a surprisingly high 
proportion of goods are returned in order to exchange them for a similar item.10 This represents 
an important consumer option to resolve uncertainty over a good’s utility without having to suffer 
“buyer’s remorse.” It seems likely that on a survey this would be reported as a single transaction 
while, in our data set, it constitutes several. Taking another approach to reconciling these purchase 
rate differences, we calculate the proportion of customers who acquire at least one item.11 While 
this number should be closer to survey estimates, it does overstate the purchase rate in our sample, 
even so only 31.7% of customers are purchasers in this sense. 
Our focus on proportion of rent paid allows us to make some indirect observations on the annual 
percentage rates (APRs) implicit in rent-to-own arrangements. Possibly the most striking feature 
of RTO is the very high cost of such ﬁnancing. Existing literature reports that such contracts 
require total payments two to four times the retail price with APRs in excess of 100% and often 
much higher (Zikmund-Fisher & Parker, 1999). Such benchmark calculations assume all required 
payments are made; however, our empirical evidence shows an average purchaser, by exercising 
the early purchase option, pays only a median (mean) rent of 80.20% (66.06%) thus mitigating 
the effective interest cost. Further, more than 60% of the items are returned and the data show 
substantial business risk due to items unrecoverable after relatively little has been paid, implying 
that actual returns are less than reported APRs. At the same time, while the true cost is not as 
high as extant estimates suggest, it is, like all subprime arrangements, dramatically higher than 
conventional ﬁnancing arrangements. 
Table 2 also disaggregates the proportion of rent paid variable by payment type and payment 
history. The results are striking. Contracts written with a weekly payment schedule conclude with 
a substantially lower percentage of rent paid as compared to those with non-weekly schedules; 
while the difference between bi-weekly and monthly is only marginal. Further, percentage rent 
paid is substantially smaller for customers who always make their payments on-time relative to 
those generally late. 
An important issue regarding the analysis of rent payment is whether the rented merchandise 
is new or used. As contracts frequently end in return, a store will commonly be re-renting a given 
total deals discussed, 48.5% resulted in purchase, 26.9% in return, 22.5% were still active, and 2.1% were Other/Do not 
Know/Refused). 
9 For example, FTC (2000) asked about transactions originated up to ﬁve years prior. 
10 For example, a customer renting a TV then returning it and, nearly simultaneously, renting a different TV, possibly 
repeating such an exchange several times. 
11 This was calculated by determining that of the 3002 customers with an inactive contract, 952 had one conclude with 
purchase or payment to term. The presence of censored agreements biases this downward, but an upper bound can be 
estimated by assuming all active (censored) agreements will end in purchase, but even this loose bound only yields a 
43.4% (=1425/3283) purchase rate. 
Fig. 1. The distribution of raw percentage rent paid is shown. The ﬁgure is a relative frequency histogram of the actual 
percentage rent paid for all 6412 completed transactions in the sample. 
item. In our sample, 34.9% of the transactions involved unique merchandise; another 43.3% 
represented merchandise under two or three agreements; 94.6% involved merchandise rented ﬁve 
or fewer times and, at the other extreme, one item had been rented ten times. For each piece of 
merchandise, considering only the outcome of the last agreement, we found that the outcome – e.g., 
return, purchase, skip – was fairly invariant. Another issue is contractual fees. RTO agreements 
impose fees for, among other things, late payment, bounced checks, if the payment needs to be hand 
collected or if the agreement lapsed and needs to be reinstated.12 This paper only considers “pure” 
rent payments—fees as well as sales taxes are excluded from the study. We believe that this pure 
rent analysis does not pose any methodological bias since the sample appears fairly homogeneous 
with regard to contract terms—especially across the merchandise subgroups considered. One 
consequence of this, going back to Table 2, is that we ﬁnd chronically late customers end up 
paying more in actual rent. 
Another interesting issue is the number of payments actually made by RTO customers. This 
depends somewhat on the agreement’s payment structure. We ﬁnd that for bi-weekly and monthly 
contracts, purchase (return) takes on average about a year (4 months). By contrast, weekly struc­
tured contracts resolve much faster with purchase (return) occurring in about one half (one third) 
of the time. While it is unsurprising that returns happen much faster – since if you knew you had 
only a short term need, you would rationally select a weekly payment schedule – it is interesting 
that when weekly payers purchase, via the early purchase option, they do so much quicker than 
do those with monthly payment schedules. We analyze this issue further with our formal model. 
Fig. 1 presents a histogram showing the relative frequency of percentage rent paid, considering 
all 6412 transactions in our sample which have concluded. The ﬁgure shows that the distribution is 
right-skewed, starting high reﬂecting the short term rentals, then sharply declining, remaining ﬂat 
reﬂecting the early purchase option, then rising somewhat at the end due to those paying to term. 
12 Further, some RTO contracts may entail a penalty for early return while others may require the consumer to purchase 
insurance on the rented merchandise. Unfortunately, a condition for obtaining the data was that the chain desired anonymity. 
Thus, we have no way to determine directly if there are requirements that customers rent a minimum number of weeks or 
take out insurance at this particular chain. 
Table 3 
Sample mean and standard deviation of the independent variables 
Variable All Appliances Electronics Furniture Other 
Age 2.214 (1.238) 2.384 (1.286) 2.158 (1.212) 2.138 (1.216) 2.182 (1.205) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.253 (0.435) 0.249 (0.433) 0.288 (0.453) 0.216 (0.412) 0.299 (0.458) 
Marital status (1 if married) 0.252 (0.434) 0.275 (0.447) 0.247 (0.431) 0.238 (0.426) 0.256 (0.437) 
Employment (1 if >6 mn) 0.471 (0.499) 0.465 (0.499) 0.468 (0.499) 0.474 (0.499) 0.495 (0.500) 
Income 2.321 (1.231) 2.353 (1.208) 2.374 (1.279) 2.267 (1.205) 2.245 (1.235) 
Government aid (1 if aid) 0.349 (0.477) 0.338 (0.473) 0.349 (0.477) 0.361 (0.480) 0.335 (0.472) 
Referral (1 if referred) 0.157 (0.364) 0.161 (0.368) 0.161 (0.367) 0.146 (0.353) 0.177 (0.382) 
Bi-weekly payment 0.258 (0.438) 0.266 (0.442) 0.239 (0.426) 0.270 (0.444) 0.245 (0.431) 
Monthly schedule 0.185 (0.389) 0.217 (0.413) 0.151 (0.358) 0.183 (0.387) 0.220 (0.414) 
Maximum payable amount 1.268 (0.952) 1.141 (0.581) 1.412 (1.196) 1.382 (0.956) 0.608 (0.486) 
Contract length 1.262 (0.370) 1.276 (0.372) 1.280 (0.385) 1.266 (0.334) 1.119 (0.426) 
Proportion late 0.368 (0.312) 0.392 (0.312) 0.333 (0.314) 0.383 (0.310) 0.347 (0.301) 
Median days late 1.741 (3.361) 1.824 (2.633) 1.538 (2.498) 1.849 (3.726) 1.730 (5.937) 
Standard deviation late 2.393 (3.952) 2.350 (2.874) 2.225 (4.705) 2.484 (3.243) 2.783 (6.403) 
Transactions to date 2.961 (2.987) 2.685 (2.991) 3.002 (3.291) 3.083 (2.615) 3.231 (3.282) 
Repeat customer (1 if repeat) 0.450 (0.498) 0.406 (0.491) 0.475 (0.500) 0.443 (0.497) 0.548 (0.498) 
The mean appears ﬁrst with the standard deviation next in parentheses. 
2.2. Independent variables 
It is hypothesized that the value of the proportion of rent paid depends on the following list of 
customer- and transaction-speciﬁc variables; the mean values of these variables along with their 
standard deviations are presented in Table 3.13 
•	 Age Qualitative age variable; 1 for 18–25 years old, 2 for 26–30 years old, 3 for 
31–40 years old, 4 for 41–55 years old, and 5 for 56+ years old 
• Gender	 Dummy variable; 1 if male 
• Marital status	 Dummy variable; 1 if married 
• Employment	 Dummy variable; 1 if employed for over 6 months 
•	 Income Qualitative income variable (in US$ 1000s); 1 for 0–5, 2 for 5–10, 3 for 10–15, 
4 for 15–20, 5 for 20–25, and 6 for more than 25 
•	 Government aid Dummy variable; 1 if the customer receives government aid in the form of 
TANF, Social Security, or welfare 
• Referral	 Dummy variable; 1 if the customer is a referral 
• Bi-weekly payment	 Dummy variable; 1 for bi-weekly payment schedule 
• Monthly payment	 Dummy variable; 1 for monthly payment schedule 
•	 Maximum payable amount Periodic payment amount multiplied by the total number of payments, 
assuming all payments are made (in US$ 1000s) 
• Contract length	 Maximum duration (in years) of agreement, if full term 
• Proportion late	 Proportion of payments of each agreement that are made late 
• Median days late	 Median number of days payments are late 
• Standard deviation late	 Standard deviation of the number of days payments are late 
• Transactions to date	 Number of transactions originated no later than the current transaction 
• Repeat customer	 Dummy variable; 1 if the customer has several, distinct transactions 
With respect to customer-speciﬁc factors, a number of demographic variables were considered. 
Age, 40.1% of the sample was 18–25 years old, 61.0% was 30 or under, 83.0% was under 40 
13 Given the possibly related variables, we investigated multicollinarity and our exploratory analysis suggested that it 
was not an issue. 
and 94.5% was 55 or less. Gender, females are greatly over-represented in the sample at 74.7%. 
Martial status, 25.2% reported being married while divorced, singled and widowed were 27.1, 
46.6 and 1.1%, respectively. Employment, 47.1% report having been employed more than 6 
months. Income, the mean income was slightly over US$ 10,000 with 97.4% below US$ 25,000. 
Government aid, 34.9% reported receiving aid in the form of either TANF—temporary assistance 
for needy families (71% of aid recipients), Social Security (26%), or welfare (3%). We note 
that these demographics are gathered at the store level at contract origination; however, they are 
generally consistent with existing literature (e.g., FTC, 2000) but are not directly comparable 
being transaction- and not customer-based. Further, concern about possible bias introduced by 
misreporting is mitigated by their relatively minor explanatory role, as is discussed in Section 4. 
We are also able to explicitly check for a reference group effect as customers were asked how 
they heard of the store; one response was referral, either directly or because a friend or relative 
was also a customer. This is captured by a dummy variable whose mean reveals that 15.7% of 
transactions were so generated. 
The transaction-speciﬁc factors are divided into those concerning contract structure, usage and 
payment history, respectively. Three contract structure variables were considered. First is payment 
type; the RTO agreement can be structured to require weekly, bi-weekly or monthly payments. 
This ability to tailor payments to income stream is an interesting consumer option as the customer 
has free choice from the menu of payment amounts and corresponding due dates. We capture this 
effect by constructing dummy variables for bi-weekly and monthly payment schedules. Nearly 
56% of agreements are on a weekly schedule with bi-weekly and monthly schedules totaling 26 
and 18%, respectively. Considering the three merchandise subgroups, we note that appliances are 
least likely to be on a weekly schedule, electronics the most. The second variable is maximum 
payable amount, the undiscounted sum of all scheduled payments over the life of the agreement. 
The sample mean is US$ 1268 with average electronics and furniture contracts running about 
US$ 1400 and appliance contracts about US$ 1100. The third variable is contract length given 
that the agreement is not terminated early. The mean length, nearly constant across groups, is 
just over 15 months. Notice these three structure variables, taken together, completely capture the 
ﬁnancial details of acquiring merchandise by paying to term with a RTO agreement—i.e., how 
much, how long, and the frequency of payments. 
The two contract usage variables focus on repeat business. The ﬁrst is transactions to date, i.e., 
the number of transactions begun no later than the current transaction by that particular customer. 
The sample mean is 2.96 transactions to date, with the average customer doing 2.29 transactions 
(dividing records by unique customers) in our sample. Clearly, having multiple transactions is 
common with RTO customers; however, the presence of multiple records does not necessarily 
imply a repeat customer. To further explore this, a dummy variable is used with a customer counted 
as a repeat only if his or her current transaction history contains an agreement not associated with 
any other transaction. Thus, a customer is not counted as a repeat if he or she has only one 
agreement in the data set or if the multiple agreements all have the same origination date – e.g., 
several items rented at one time but placed on separate agreements – or if the agreements ran 
sequentially, with one starting the same date the prior one ended—e.g., a customer renting an 
item then returning it in exchange for another. Looking at the sample mean, 45% of customers 
are repeat in the above sense. 
Contract payment history is captured with three variables. The ﬁrst, proportion late, is simply 
the number of late payments divided by the total number of payments made. The sample mean 
is 36.8%, i.e., almost two of every ﬁve payments are late, a fairly striking result. Further, while 
this proportion is similar for the three subgroups, we note that it is highest for appliances and 
� � � � 
lowest for electronics, echoing the differences in payment type among groups. Second, we 
consider the median days that individual payments are late. Note that, for a given transaction, 
this variable is zero unless at least half the payments are late. It is a measure of lateness for 
the 44% of transactions for which the majority of payments are not on-time, capturing extreme 
delays in making payments. The ﬁnal variable is the standard deviation of the number of days 
that payments are late for each transaction’s payment history. Thus, if a customer always paid 
on-time or was always, say, a day late, the standard deviation would be zero while it increases 
with payment variability. The idea is predictability of payments should proxy for a consumer’s 
ﬁnancial uncertainty. Together, these three variables capture if payments are late, how late, and 
the predictability of lateness, respectively.14 
3. Methodology 
The dependent variable in this study is the proportion of rent paid. As seen in Table 1, the exact 
value of this variable is available for 85.3% of the contracts. For such contracts, the transaction 
has concluded either as a charge off or as a return (these outcomes are deﬁned in footnote 7 and 
detailed in Table 1). In the remaining 14.7% of the cases, the contract is still active at the end 
of the data acquisition period and represents a right-censored observation as the customer is still 
paying rent. 
∗Let y be a latent variable representing the proportion of rent paid in a RTO contract where i ∗ y is not observable for some i = 1,  2,  . . ., N. The observed variable, yi, denotes the proportion of i ∗rent paid at the end of the data acquisition period. For completed contracts y = yi and for active i ∗ ∗ contracts y ≥ yi implying that y is right censored at yi. As is customary in Tobit-type censored i i 
models, we began our analysis under the assumption of homoscedasticity and normality. For a 
randomly drawn contract, let 
∗  y = β xi + εi where εi|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2) (1)i 
Let Ci be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the contract is completed and 0 when it is 
censored. The log-likelihood for the censored regression models is 
N � �2 N � � �� 1 yi − β xi yi − β xi 
L = Ci − ln(2πσ2) + + (1 − Ci) ln 1 − Φ 2 σ σ 
i=1 i=1 (2) 
This likelihood function is maximized in the usual way to obtain the parameters estimates. 
Censored models are known to be especially sensitive to the assumptions of normality and 
heteroscedasticity implied by (1) above. The estimates will generally be inconsistent if the errors 
are heteroscedastic or non-symmetric (see the special issue on this topic edited by Blundell, 1987). 
These assumptions are usually tested using the Lagrange Multiplier or the conditional moment 
restriction framework (see Chesher & Irish, 1987, and Pagan & Vella, 1989).15 
We implement the above two speciﬁcation tests, which overwhelmingly reject the assumption 
of homoscedasticity and normality at the 1% level. The histogram presented in Fig. 1 helps 
14 The payment history variables are not strictly exogenous; however, given our transactional data, their inclusion allows 
us to document interesting relationships between payment history and contract usage. 
15 It is worth noting that tests based on the BHHH estimator are known to reject more often than the chosen level of 
signiﬁcance, especially when the data are censored (see Jaggia, 1997). 
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explain why the normal model may be inappropriate as the distribution of the percentage rent 
paid is clearly positively skewed. We employ the log-normal distribution as a more suitable 
parametric alternative.16 The model is attractive as it explicitly deals with the positive nature 
of the proportion of rent paid variable. Further, since the variance of a log-normally distributed 
variable is proportional to the square of its mean, it implicitly includes a particular kind of 
heteroscedasticity (see Amemiya, 1973). This distribution is also ﬂexible in that it accommodates 
a variety of positively skewed shapes while still specializing to a symmetric distribution. 
The distribution of y * is log-normally distributed when ln(y *) has a normal distribution with 
mean β xi and variance σ2. The log-likelihood function of a log-normal model with censored 
observations is given by:   �
N 1 ln(yi) − β xi 22L = Ci − ln(2πσ y 2) + 2 σ 
i=1 
n ln(yi) − β xi + (1 − Ci) ln 1 − Φ (3)
σ 
i=1 
The results of the log-normal model are presented in Table 4. We should bear in mind that the 
coefﬁcients β measure the marginal effect of the factor on the conditional median (or mean) in 
the normal regression model. For a log-normal model, the relevant conditional mean and median 
are: 
σ2 ∗ ∗ E(yi |xi) = exp β xi + and Med(yi |xi) = exp(β xi) (4)2 
The estimated marginal effect on the median and mean at the average factor values, for all 
transactions, are 0.14β and 0.32β, respectively. The next section of the paper presents and analyzes 
the results derived from our lognormal model. 
4. Results 
We begin by focusing on overall, aggregated transactions, i.e., the ﬁrst column in Table 4. 
Throughout this section “signiﬁcant” means signiﬁcant at the 1% level unless otherwise noted. 
One picture that emerges, looking at customer-speciﬁc factors, is that it seems to be the “working 
poor” that are paying more rent. This is supported by the employment length variable being positive 
and signiﬁcant while the income level variable is negative and signiﬁcant. This is consistent with 
the notion that the longer an individual remains employed at a low income job the more likely 
that situation will persist and so the more valuable is RTO as a means to acquire merchandise. 
Further support comes from the variable for the consumer’s age being positive and signiﬁcant 
as it is reasonable to believe that the older one gets, still having low income, the fewer are the 
available alternatives. The gender and marital status variables are both insigniﬁcant, generally. 
Interestingly, whether or not the consumer receives government aid is negative and signiﬁcant in 
16 We also estimated a semi-parametric, censored least absolute deviation (CLAD), model that provides consistent 
estimates for censored data even when the data are non-normal and heteroskedastic (see Melenberg & Soest, 1996, for a 
good application). The corresponding results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the log-normal model but 
are not included in the paper for the sake of brevity. 
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the log-normal model. This is somewhat suggestive that aid is picking up transitional periods in a 
consumer’s life. The referral variable is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting some type of reference 
group effect, with consumers whose circle of contacts contains other RTO customers being more 
likely to use this arrangement as a means to acquire merchandise. These results are generally 
consistent with McKernan et al. (2003) which, using the FTC (2000) data set, contrasted likely 
renter from purchasers. They found that likely purchasers (and so those paying more rent) tended 
to have lower income, less education, more children and were more likely to be unemployed and 
to be separated. 
Turning to transaction-speciﬁc variables, we ﬁrst consider the three contract structure variables. 
First is payment type, i.e., whether a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly payment schedule was selected 
by the consumer at the beginning of the agreement. The bi-weekly and monthly dummy variables 
are both highly signiﬁcant with the coefﬁcient being somewhat higher for the monthly dummy. 
These results suggest that those selecting monthly agreements pay a higher proportion of total rent 
than those with bi-weekly agreements who, in turn, pay more than those with weekly agreements. 
One possible explanation is that the payment schedule is selected based on the consumer’s expected 
income stream and other available resources. This would imply that a consumer needing a weekly 
schedule has a more marginal ﬁnancial existence than does someone opting for monthly and 
consequently is more likely to end up terminating – or being terminated in – the relationship. 
Another explanation is that this captures pre-selection by customers based on their expectation 
for the outcome, either rental or purchase. That is, those expecting to rent would prefer a weekly 
arrangement for the greater ﬂexibility offered while those expecting to purchase prefer monthly 
for the greater convenience. 
One can also hypothesize a behavioral component. Perhaps the greater frequency of payments 
under a weekly arrangement, relative to non-weekly, prompts a closer examination of the beneﬁts 
and costs which is more likely to result in the positive action of the consumer returning the 
merchandise. This ﬁnding may appear to be anomalous in standard economic theory which says 
that the ﬁnancing method is important only insofar as the present value of payments is minimized. 
However, our results suggest that the consumption process is partially explained by the way the 
purchase is ﬁnanced. This is consistent with the general behavioral argument of mental accounting 
(see Thaler, 1985). For instance, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) argue that due to the interaction 
between the pleasures of consumption and the pain of paying, the decisions made by consumers 
may well depend on the way the purchase is ﬁnanced. Regardless of underlying reason, the effect 
of the payment type variables clearly reveals some type of clientele effect at work. 
The remaining two structure variables, maximum payment amount and contract length, address 
the question of how much and how long. Both variables are found to be negative and signiﬁcant. 
Perhaps these variables are capturing the impact of the greater ﬁnancial burden placed on the 
customer by longer and/or more expensive agreements. Alternatively, such items are being viewed 
by consumers as luxury goods intended only for short-term rental, e.g., a big screen TV for a 
Superbowl party. 
Turning next to contract usage variables we focus on the impact of repeat business. A reasonable 
prior seems to be that, for a given customer, more transactions equate into a greater reliance on this 
ﬁnancing method and so into more rent paid. However, we ﬁnd that the transactions to date variable 
is negative and signiﬁcant implying that the more deals a customer has already done the less rent 
will be paid on a new transaction. Although this ﬁnding may appear counter intuitive, it can be 
reconciled by noting that it is not uncommon for one transaction to be terminated and a new one 
created due to a service problem or a customer desire to do an exchange for similar merchandise. 
To address this, we considered a repeat customer dummy that equals one only if the customer’s 
current transaction history contains a transaction unrelated to any other, i.e., involving different 
merchandise and/or disjoint intervals. Consequently, it captures whether the customer was truly 
a repeat customer and, as expected, it is found to be positive and signiﬁcant. The results found 
for contract length and repeat customers are also consistent with the Zikmund-Fisher and Parker 
(1999) thesis, given their emphasis on the difﬁculty such consumers have saving/self-managing. 
Three variables were considered to evaluate contract payment history. The ﬁrst is the proportion 
of payments made late, i.e., total late payments to total payments made for a given transaction. 
One would expect this variable to negatively inﬂuence total rent paid, either because the customer 
gives up trying to make the payments or the store acts to reclaim the merchandise. We ﬁnd that 
this variable is highly signiﬁcant but, interestingly, positively affects rent paid. A reasonable 
explanation is that this variable proxies for the ﬁnancial uncertainty in a customer’s life, i.e., the 
more difﬁculty one has in paying his or her bills the less likely he or she is to have access to other 
methods of acquisition. Alternatively, it may reﬂect on the personality trait of a customer who 
is not particularly efﬁcient in managing either time or ﬁnances. As a practical matter, given the 
general lateness of RTO customers, the longer a contract runs the greater the proportion of late 
payments on average, resulting in a positive relation between rent paid and proportion late. The 
second variable is the median days late which is non-zero only if at least half of the payments are 
late (true for some 44% of the sample). Thus, increasing values represent not only difﬁculty paying 
on-time but also signiﬁcant delays in making those payments. This variable is highly signiﬁcant 
across all groups, and, in line with the original intuition, negatively affects rent paid. Finally, the 
standard deviation of the days late variable is positive and signiﬁcant overall, consistent with the 
notion that this proxies income shocks to the consumer, with greater variability associated with 
less certain ﬁnances and so a greater need to use rent-to-own as a means to acquire merchandise. 
Reviewing the above results, an important observation can be made. Comparing the customer-
and transaction-speciﬁc variables, it seems that as interesting as who these customers are, more 
important is how the contracts are being used. Qualitatively, the transaction-speciﬁc variables 
have greater explanatory power over a given contractual outcome. A reasonable conclusion is 
that RTO customers, despite the demographic variation, are actually fairly homogeneous. That is, 
the deﬁning factor is their membership in this group, which is determined primarily by economic 
factors. Given this, the variation observed can be traced to the duration of stay in such an economic 
situation which is better explained by contract usage. 
To further highlight the results, Table 5 presents some simulations using the estimated parame­
ters to show how, for a representative consumer, the proportion of rent paid varies with a change in 
one variable. These simulations are carried out using the estimates from the censored lognormal 
model for both median and mean. Notice that the means exceed the medians, reﬂecting the skew­
ness of the data. For instance, the estimated median (mean) evaluated at the average for all factors 
is 14.11% (32.26%). In general, the estimated values are consistent with the descriptive measures 
in Table 2. Perhaps the most striking result is that the median (mean) rent paid more than doubles 
as one goes from weekly to bi-weekly payment schedules then increases still more going from 
bi-weekly to monthly schedules. These results seem to indicate that the clientele effect is not only 
signiﬁcant, it is also very strong in magnitude. Also interesting is the roughly 30% jump in rent 
paid by older customers, reﬂecting a nearly 40% jump in the Appliance and Furniture categories 
but virtually no change in Electronics, moving from the 18–25 years old group to the 41–55 group. 
This is quite consistent with the hypothesis that the older one gets still having low income, the 
fewer are the available alternatives, as it appears that RTO is being used more as an acquisition 
mechanism and more for household essentials by the older age group. Similar predictions with 
respect to income level, referred customer, and repeat customer are informative as well. 
Table 5 
Estimated median (mean) percentage rent paid 
Variable All Appliances Electronics Furniture 
Average 14.11 (32.22) 16.52 (36.26) 10.23 (23.21) 15.52 (34.24) 
Payment type 
Weekly 
Bi-weekly 
Monthly 
8.83 (20.15) 
23.92 (54.63) 
27.68 (63.19) 
9.93 (21.79) 
26.33 (57.79) 
31.27 (68.63) 
6.69 (15.18) 
18.64 (42.27) 
22.12 (50.17) 
9.53 (21.02) 
26.10 (57.56) 
30.97 (68.31) 
Age 
18–25 years 
41–55 years 
12.65 (28.87) 
16.58 (37.85) 
14.03 (30.79) 
19.99 (43.88) 
10.13 (22.98) 
10.40 (23.58) 
13.77 (30.38) 
18.88 (41.64) 
Income level 
Less than US$ 5,000 
More than US$ 25,000 
16.60 (37.90) 
8.97 (20.49) 
18.63 (40.90) 
11.93 (26.20) 
11.64 (26.40) 
7.28 (16.52) 
18.50 (40.81) 
9.25 (20.41) 
Referred customer 
0 
1 
13.56 (30.95) 
17.50 (39.96) 
15.74 (34.55) 
21.25 (46.64) 
9.83 (22.30) 
12.61 (28.61) 
15.06 (33.21) 
18.55 (40.93) 
Repeat customer 
0 
1 
12.74 (29.10) 
15.98 (36.48) 
15.25 (33.48) 
18.56 (40.74) 
9.38 (21.28) 
11.26 (25.54) 
14.08 (31.06) 
17.55 (38.70) 
Censored log-normal model. The table is constructed using the indicated variable value together with the mean factor 
values of all other model variables. For each category, the estimated median appears ﬁrst with the mean next in parentheses. 
Table 6 
Estimated median (mean) percentage rent paid 
p d m σ All Appliances Electronics Furniture 
0.00 – 0 0 5.96 (13.62) 6.86 (15.06) 4.21 (9.56) 6.67 (14.71) 
0.40 
7 
14 
0 
0 
3.43 
6.86 
18.17 (41.49) 
21.11 (48.19) 
23.11 (50.72) 
29.24 (64.17) 
15.62 (35.42) 
16.77 (38.05) 
19.32 (42.63) 
24.23 (53.45) 
0.80 
7 
14 
7 
14 
2.80 
5.60 
27.46 (62.69) 
18.38 (41.96) 
23.24 (51.01) 
11.11 (24.39) 
22.52 (51.09) 
10.11 (22.94) 
26.99 (59.53) 
20.46 (45.13) 
Censored log-normal model. In the table p, m and σ represent proportion, median and standard deviation late, respectively. 
We assume a binary distribution for payment timing, either 0 or d days late, with d = 7 and 14. Note, m = d(0) if p>(<)0.5;√ 
further, σ = d p(1 − p). For each category, the estimated median appears ﬁrst with the mean next in parentheses. 
Table 6 presents simulations with respect to the three payment history variables: proportion, 
median days, and standard deviation late. To provide more intuition into their relation, we induce 
a mapping into the days a given payment is late. We assume payments are made in a binary 
fashion, either on-time (zero days late) or some constant number of days late, d; then, given the 
proportion of late payments, this gives us a simple relation between a payment’s number of days 
late and both the median and standard deviation late variables.17 Three different late proportions 
17 Letting p, m and σ represent proportion, median and standard deviation late, respectively, we have m = d(0) if p>(<)0.5 J
and σ = p(d − pd)2 + (1 − p)(0 − pd)2 = d √ p(1 − p). Note this last relation implies a right-skewed distribution 
with mean less than standard deviation, ∀d > 0 and p ∈ (0,0.5); this is consistent with the observed sample moments with 
the average and standard deviation of mean days late being 2.313 and 3.785 days, respectively. 
are considered. For the ﬁrst, always on-time, the other two variables are zero and the estimated 
median (mean) rent paid is below 7% (16%) for all subgroups; perhaps illustrating that those 
organized enough with their ﬁnances to pay on-time are more likely to be just renting. Second, 
when 40% of payments are late, the median days late is zero and so only proportion and standard 
deviation affect the result. Consumers pay more rent than the ﬁrst case, especially as payments 
go from one to two weeks late. Finally, when 80% of payments are late, the median late effect 
dominates the other two variables. Although, for payments one week late, rent paid increases 
as the proportion late goes from 40 to 80%, the increase in days late from one to two weeks 
reduces rent paid. It is worth mentioning that the 90th percentile for median days late is only 6 
days so these results are illustrative rather than predictive. Assuming a correlation between late 
payment behavior and consumer ﬁnancial uncertainty, Table 6 illustrates how greater uncertainty 
translates into greater reliance on rent-to-own as a ﬁnancing method and is consistent with the 
sample characteristics presented in Table 2. It is also worth noting that this illustration agrees with 
the more psychological results found by Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999), where preference 
for RTO seemed to reﬂect a response to ﬁnancial uncertainty. 
To gain additional insights, the data set was partitioned into merchandise categories: appli­
ances, electronics, and furniture; this breakdown is reported in Table 1. Comparison of the model 
estimates on these subgroups (the last three columns in Table 4) suggest that the results are 
broadly similar, although different in magnitude. Further we note some intriguing differences. 
For instance, relative to other renters, those contracting for furniture tend to be younger and have 
lower income, suggesting some type of life cycle effect. Also interesting is the gender behavioral 
difference suggesting that men are least likely to instigate a furniture rental but when they do, 
they pay a higher proportion of rent. Electronics is alone in being inﬂuenced by martial status; 
speciﬁcally, those married pay more rent. Finally, the appliance category is unique among the sub­
groups in not being inﬂuenced by the maximum amount due and by the presence of government 
aid—both factors elsewhere reducing rent paid. 
The above analysis makes no explicit allowance for the difference between the behavior of 
renters and purchasers. It is however possible that there is some type of preselection distort­
ing the results. That is, we may have “renters” and “purchasers” who behave fundamentally 
different—this would agree with Fig. 1 where perhaps the early peak is due to renters and the 
smaller peak at the end from purchasers. To allow for the psychology underlying consumer behav­
ior to differ, the percentage of rent paid variable is analyzed for renters (purchasers) by excluding 
purchasers (renters) from the sample.18 Table 7 provides the model estimates. The model predicts, 
evaluating at mean factor values, an overall median percentage rent paid of 11.02% (75.62%) for 
returns (purchases)—consistent with the sample values in Table 2. 
It is interesting how qualitatively similar the results are in terms of both covariate signs and 
levels of signiﬁcance. This robustness provides a check for our general methodological approach. 
However, the partitioning highlights the difference in the magnitude of the estimated parameters. 
For instance, as we move from a weekly to a monthly contract, the median percentage rent paid 
increases from 7.49 to 20.85% for a renter but only from 57.89 to 82.12% for a purchaser. This 
shows that weekly contracts are not only associated with a lower purchase probability – 37% (65%) 
of the completed purchases (rentals) are on weekly schedules – they also terminate quicker. As 
mentioned earlier, we believe it is the frequency of reminders in a weekly schedule that makes 
18 Such a partitioning introduces a possible sample selection bias, however, it affords additional insights into consumer 
behavior. We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion. 
Table 7 
Estimates of a censored log-normal model for return and purchase 
Parameter Return Purchase 
Constant −3.209** (−36.769) −2.040** (−15.664) 
Age 0.056** (3.514) 0.062** (2.724) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.064 (1.550) 0.222** (3.532) 
Marital status (1 if married) 0.063 (1.446) −0.055 (−0.897) 
Employment (1 if >6 mn) 0.156** (3.407) 0.155* (2.222) 
Income −0.108** (−5.522) −0.072** (−2.598) 
Government aid (1 if aid) −0.153** (−3.195) −0.336** (−4.606) 
Referral (1 if referred) 0.195** (4.082) 0.236** (3.606) 
Bi-weekly payment 0.945** (22.224) 0.526** (8.561) 
Monthly schedule 1.024** (20.387) 0.355** (5.624) 
Maximum payable amount −0.098** (−4.735) 0.212** (4.640) 
Contract length −0.117* (−2.015) 0.463** (5.390) 
Proportion late 1.997** (26.640) 1.168** (11.399) 
Median days late −0.114** (−14.231) −0.042** (−4.888) 
Standard deviation late 0.174** (17.080) 0.045** (4.581) 
Transactions to date −0.011 (−1.760) 0.004 (0.343) 
Repeat customer (1 if repeat) 0.200** (4.987) 0.175** (2.810) 
σ (“shape” parameter) 1.240** (93.676) 1.111** (55.631) 
Renters (purchasers) are analyzed by excluding transactions that concluded with a purchase (return) from the sample. 
* Represents signiﬁcance at the 5% level. 
** Represents signiﬁcance at the 1% level. 
the early purchase option attractive in that the earlier you buy, the less you pay in total. So again, 
one sees those under a weekly schedule coming to a conclusion quicker. 
The separate analysis also sheds light on some important differences in response to some factors 
by renters and purchasers. For instance, the contract structure variables – maximum payable 
amount and contract length – are highly signiﬁcant for both models. However, for renters they 
exert a negative inﬂuence on the percentage rent paid whereas for purchasers it is positive. For 
illustration, consider two contract structures: US$ 500 maximum amount on a 6-month contract, 
and US$ 1000 maximum amount on a 12-month contract. The percentage rent paid for returns 
(purchases) is estimated as 13.20% (47.55%) for the former and 11.83% (66.79%) for the latter. 
As the latter contract would be associated with the underlying merchandise being less affordable, 
it is not surprising that there would be more time required in contract and so a greater percentage 
rent paid in the case of purchasers. Similarly, for a given short-term rental need, as either of those 
structure variables increase, percentage rent paid would naturally decline. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examined rent-to-own contracts. It utilized data comprised of some 7500 actual 
transactions in contrast to existing literature which has relied on interview or survey data. One 
important policy question involves whether, in practice, an RTO contract is used as a rental/lease 
agreement with built-in purchase option, or as something more akin to an installment credit 
agreement. We ﬁnd that RTO is more like a lease as 72.88% of completed agreements resulted in 
the return of the item to the store. Further, we ﬁnd that the median (mean) percentage rent paid is 
14.70% (28.91%). The data also highlight the presence of signiﬁcant business risk. We ﬁnd that 
unfavorable charge offs (where the store writes off the merchandise as unrecoverable) represent 
almost 13% of total charge offs and in such situations the median (mean) rent paid is about 
20% (27%). A signiﬁcant attraction of RTO is immediate access to merchandise without a credit 
check; however, our data shows that this involves signiﬁcant cross-subsidization of customers, 
which helps explain the high APRs reported in the literature. 
To more formally examine the rent a customer pays, we employed a Tobit type log-normal 
model for censored data. The variable of interest was the proportion of rent paid relative to 
that due if the contract went to term. We found that transaction-speciﬁc variables have greater 
explanatory power on the amount of rent that a customer pays than customer-speciﬁc ones. 
It appeared that RTO consumers are deﬁned more by their economic circumstances than by 
demographics; the most striking implication being that consumers end up paying more rent when 
they are disorganized—either by nature or circumstance, as evidenced by their late payment 
behavior, or when the contract speciﬁes payments either bi-weekly or monthly, as opposed to 
weekly. RTO customers are the “working poor,” frequently viewed as unsophisticated but clearly 
with few ﬁnancial options. Rent-to-own is possibly a valuable option given a choice not between 
cash or charge but rather between layaway or deferring consumption. We found that in general 
the percentage of rent paid is fairly low, due in part to the large proportion of returns. While some 
of these returns represent “failed purchases,” it seems plausible that associated with ﬁnancial 
uncertainty is uncertainty over aspects of personal life and so a sizable number of these returns 
do reﬂect short term needs. 
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